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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the proceeds as open accounts in their respective books. Further, the
fact that the defendant notified the complaining witnesses of the receipt
of the funds would indicate that he did not intend to permanently with-
hold the funds from the partnership.
The outcome of the instant case would seem correct, but it is submitted
that certain emphasis in the case is somewhat misleading. The court
states?
The only possible circumstance which would indicate an intent to
fraudulently deprive the Grizzly Bear Company of its money per-
manently is the assertion by Ted Gustafson, one of the complain-
ing witnesses, that the defendant did not inform him of his re-
ceipt of the proceeds until some two or three weeks after the car
was loaded and shipped. However, there is nothing in the record
to indicate even roughly the date this remittance was received by
Smith so we are in no way able to infer that he concealed, even for
a short time, his receipt of the money. (Emphasis added.)
The court in the instant case seems to place great weight on the fact that
there was no concealment of the money by the defendant. Concealment is
almost terated as an essential element of the crime. Conceding that con-
cealment is nearly always present in cases of larceny, it would seem that
its absence would not make a criminal act any less unlawful. Can it be
said that a person who performs all the elements necessary for the crime
of larceny can escape prosecution simply by taking and holding the stolen
property openly and notoriously? Such a position would clearly be un-
tenable and erroneous.
Undue stress was also given to the fact that the owner was lax for a
time in enforcing payment. Logically it does not seem that the bailor's sub-
sequent conduct should have anything to do with whether a crime was
committed. If a bailee intends to permanently convert the property at the
outset, the crime should be completed at that time. If the crime is then
complete, the owner's subsequent conduct should not exculpate the of-
fender.
MAURICE R. COLBERG, JR.
DIVORCE--MODIFICATION PROCEEDING AFTER FINAL DECREE-COUNSEL
FEEs-In 1954, the defendant wife was granted a final decree of divorce
from the appellant. She was awarded custody of their minor children sub-
ject to visitation rights of the appellant. In 1955, after the statutory
time for appeal of a divorce decree had expired, the appellant filed for a
modification of the custody order, seeking to restrict the residence of
the children. The lower court denied the appellant's motion and allowed
the wife counsel fees. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, af-
'Instant case at 1102.
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firmed. Under section 21-137 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,'
counsel fees may be awarded a wife in an action for modification of a cus-
tody order, even though the divorce decree is final and the time for appeal
has expired. Barbour v. Barbour, 330 P.2d 1093 (Mont. 1958) (Justice
Adair dissenting; Justice Angstman dissenting in part).'
. Two statutory provisions are pertinent to this decision. R.C.M. 1947,
section 21-137 is the statutory authority giving power to a court to grant
counsel fees to a wife in a divorce action. It provides that such fees may
be awarded "while an action for divorce is pending."' R.C.M. 1947, sec-
tion 93-8706 provides that "an action is deemed to be pending from the
time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or
until the time for appeal has passed." There is substantial authority in
other jurisdictions having like statutes holding that counsel fees may be
allowed a wife on a custody modification proceeding, even after final di-
vorce, on the theory that a custody proceeding is merely a continuation of
the divorce action.' However, there is contrary authority under similar
statutes, holding that a final divorce decree ends the action within the
meaning of a statute which provides that such fees may be awarded "dur-
ing the pendency" of a divorce action Several Montana decisions, more
fully dealt with later, maintain that divorce actions are purely statutory
and the power of the court over such actions is solely that conferred by
statute. On the other hand, the court in the present case, citing author-
ities, allowed counsel fees under what it termed "the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the court in aid of the welfare of the children and its inherent
equitable power.'"
From a study of the Montana cases, it appears that prior to the case
of McDonald v. McDonoald, decided in 1950, the Montana Court construed
section 21-137 as clearly not permitting the award of counsel fees to a wife
after a divorce decree becomes final on appeal or the time for appeal has
expired.' Even though these cases did not involve custody proceedings
'REvisETa CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, are hereinafter cited R.C.M. 1947.
'Only that portion of the decision which relates to the award of counsel fees will be
considered herein.
'Emphasis supplied. This section, more fully quoted, provides that "while an action
for divorce is pending the court ... may ... require the husband to pay as alimony
any money necessary to enable the wife to support herself or her children, or to
prosecute or defend the action. When the husband wilfully deserts the wife, she
may, without applying for a divorce, maintain . . . an action against him for per-
manent support and maintenance. During the pendency of such action, the court
. may ... require the husband to pay... any money necessary for the prosecu-
tion of the action." Justice Adair, dissenting in the case of Trudgen v. Trudgen,
329 P.2d 225 (Mont. 1958), pointed out that the second and third sentences of this
section have no application whatever to an action for divorce. They refer solely
to an action for permanent support and maintenance without applying for a di-
vorce. It follows from that construction of the section that an award of counsel
fees in the present case can only be justified under the first sentence of the section.
'Clayton v. Clayton, 117 Cal. App. 2d 7, 254 P.2d 669 (195.3) : Chambers v. Chambers,
75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906) : Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. App.
1946).
'Wallace v. Wallace, 273 Mass. 62, 172 N.E. 914 (1930) ; Lake v. Lake, 194 N.Y. 179,
87 N.E. 87 (1909) ; Bishop v. Bishop, 205 N.Y. Supp 542, 210 App. Dlv. 2 (1924).
'Instant case at 1096.
'124 Mont. 26, 218 P.2d 929 (1950).
'Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 29 Mont. 478, 75 Pac. 359 (1904) ; Grimstad v. Grimstad,
61 Mont. 18, 201 Pac. 314 (1921) ; Albrecht v. Albrecht, 83 Mont. 37, 269 Pac. 158
(1924).
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following a final divorce decree, the court refused to extend the section
beyond its plain and obvious meaning. These cases generally concerned
the question whether the wife, in an independent action after a final di-
vorce decree, was entitled to recover counsel fees incurred in the divorce
action. The cases agreed that she could not. A research of the decisions
prior to 1950 revealed no cases in which, by way of dictum or otherwise,
it was said or even implied that there might be special instances when a
wife might be awarded counsel fees after a final decree of divorce. Rather,
the language of the court in these earlier cases justifies the conclusion that
it considered the statute susceptible to but one meaning; viz., counsel fees
may be awarded a wife only while a divorce action is pending; and such
action is deemed to be pending only until the divorce decree is final after
appeal or after the time for appeal has expired. In Grimstad v. Grimstad,'
after quoting the pertinent statutes, the court said:
It requires but a casual reading of section 3677 [now section
21-137] to ascertain that the object of the legislature in enacting
it was to give the courts discretionary power, to be exercised dur-
ing the pendency of the action ... to compel the husband to pro-
vide the means necessary to enable her to prosecute or defend the
action. In other words, the power in this behalf conferred by the
statute is only ancillary to, or an incident of, an action for divorce.
This renders the conclusion necessary that when the main power
conferred by this section has ceased to be operative, the ancillary
or incidental power also ceases to be operative and cannot be
invoked.
The Montana Supreme Court, in these earlier cases, apparently found
little difficulty in construing this section, but the case of McDonald v.
McDonald established at least an exception, if not a contrary rule.* In
that decision it was held that counsel fees may be allowed after a final
divorce decree in an action for modification of a child custody order. The
rationale of that case was that even though the divorce decree had become
final between the parties, the fact that minor children were involved vested
the court with a continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate with regard to
their custody; and for this reason the action remained "pending." In
1954, the McDonald case was overruled.' The court held that the pertinent
sections were clearly intended by the legislature to allow the award of
counsel fees only "during the pendency" of a divorce suit and not on a
modification of a child custody order after the decree became final. In
1958, this case was overruled and the rule of the McDonald case was re-
instated."0 The present case, decided shortly thereafter, affirms the Mc-
Donald case. It is interesting to note that the four cases just referred to,
decided since 1950, were decided on virtually the same facts. The fact
that each case includes a vigorous dissent indicates the uncertainty exist-
ing as to the proper construction of section 21-137.
It is arguable that the legislature impliedly ratified the construction
061 Mont. 18, 22, 201 Pac. 314, 315 (1921).
0124 Mont. 26, 218 P.2d 929 (1960).
"Wilson v. Wilson, 128 Mont. 511, 278 P.2d 219 (1954).
"Trudgen v. Trudgen, 329 P.2d 225 (Mont. 1958).
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placed on section 21-137 by the court in the Wilson case." In two suc-
cessive legislative assemblies which met after the Wilson decision in 1954
and before that case was overruled in 1958, a bill was proposed which
would have clearly allowed counsel fees in an action for modification of
a custody order, even though the decree was final. House Bill number
329, introduced in the Thirty-Fourth Legislative Assembly (1955), sought
to amend the first sentence of section 21-137 by inserting after the words,
"while an action for divorce is pending," the words, "or upon any action
or proceeding for modification of any order or decree therein." A similar
bill was proposed in the Thirty-Fifth Legislative Assembly (1957). Both
bills were killed in the Senate." There is substantial authority to the ef-
fect that such action is tantamount to legislative ratification of the con-
struction placed upon a statute by the courts." The Montana court, in
Bottomly v. Ford, said:
The fact that the legislature has not seen fit by amendment to
express disapproval of a . . . judicial interpretation of a par-
ticular statute, has been referred to as bolstering such construc-
tion . . . or as persuasive evidence of the adoption of the . . . con-
struction .... The failure to . . . [amend] amounts to legislative
approval and ratification . . . and . . . such construction should
generally be adhered to, leaving it to the legislature to amend the
law should a change be deemed necessary. These rules are par-
ticularly applicable where an amendment is presented to the leg-
islature and fails of enactment."
There is also substantial authority to the effect that a long standing
construction of a statute by the courts becomes a part of the statute it-
self and any changes thereafter should come from the legislature and not
the courts." Since the court consistently construed section 21-137 in cases
decided before 1950, it should, under the above rule, be presumed that the
legislature acquiesced in that construction. Assuming that the McDonald
case' was not in accord with cases decided prior to 1950, it is arguable
that a change, if desired, should have been accomplished through legisla-
tive action. This position is taken by Justice Adair, dissenting in the
principal case and in the Trudgen case.' In both cases, the dissenter's basic
proposition is that a court cannot lawfully do by construction what the
legislature refused to do by enactment. In other words, the court, by
reversing its prior construction, was unlawfully exercising a legislative
function.
"Note 10 supra,
"R.C.M. 1947, § 21-137 has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1895.
'Bottomly v. Ford, 117 Mont. 160, 157 P.2d 108 (1945); State v. State Board of
Equalization, 324 P.2d 1057 (Mont. 1958) ; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Employment
Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P.2d 935 (1941) ; Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229,
60 A.2d 691 (1948).
'6117 Mont. 160, 168,157 P.2d 108,112 (1945).
"Pouch v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 204 N.Y. 281, 97 N.E. 731 (1912) ; Manley v. Mayer,
68 Kan. 377, 75 Pac. 550 (1904) ; Lowman and Hanford Co. v. Ervin, 157 Wash.
649, 290 Pac. 221 (1930); Industrial Loan Corp. v. Swanson, 223 Minn. 346, 26
N.W.2d 625 (1947) ; Coleman v. Coleman, 94 N.H. 456, 55 A.2d 471 (1947).
'Note 9 supra.
"Note 11 supra.
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It is apparent that the court has indulged in a vacillating construc-
tion of section 21-137. This construction has rendered the meaning of the
section uncertain. Litigants and attorneys, who must necessarily look to
statutory law for guidance in divorce proceedings, may justifiably hesitate
to place any reliance on the court's latest construction. That such a situa-
tion is undesirable is plainly evident. Since parents often become dis-
satisfied with custody orders and frequently institute modification pro-
ceedings with regard thereto, the number of litigants affected is substantial.
It appears that this situation might have been avoided if changes in the
construction of the statute had been left to the legislature.
THEODORE CORONTZOS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--LIABILITY FOR POLICE NEGLIGENCE-DUTY
TO PROTECT INFORMERs-Plaintiff's intestate son, in response to an FBI
flyer, furnished information to the New York police concerning the where-
abouts of the notorious criminal, Willie Sutton. His part in the capture
of Sutton was widely publicized. Thereafter he received threats against
the safety of himself and his family, and was afforded police protection
for a short while. The threats continued but police protection was dis-
continued in spite of request. He was shot to death three weeks later,
walking home from work. An action for damages was filed against the
City of New York by decedent Schuster's father as administrator of his
estate, alleging that his death was due to the negligent failure of the city
to use ordinary or reasonable care for Schuster's security and protection.
The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it lacked facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. On appeal the New York Court of Ap-
peals divided three and three. After appointment of an additional justice
to sit on the case, on reargument before the Court of Appeals, held, re-
versed. A municipality has a duty, the breach of which will support a
cause of action, to exercise reasonable care for the protection against re-
taliation of a person who has aided in the enforcement of the criminal
law. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
The breach of a duty is the foundation of any liability in negligence.
Hence the problem with the instant case is to find, or create, a duty of rea-
sonable protection running from the New York City Police to an informer
who has aided them in a capture, and who reasonably appears to be in dan-
ger. Generally a duty arises from a relationship between the parties which
brings them sufficiently close together that the conduct of each can have
a substantial effect on the other. This relation may be one of activity
and space, such as is involved in the operation of an automobile, or it can
be a status relation such as "invitee" or "employee." A duty arising
from an act can be inferred from the act itself without much difficulty.
On the other hand, a duty breached by an omission, since there has been
no act, must be established on independent grounds.' Since the instant
case involved only inaction, any duty must be independently established.
'On duty generally, see Winfield, Duty in Tortios8 Negligence, 34 COLUM. 1 Rzv. 41
(1934).
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